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Nowadays, Italian Savings Banks (SBs) are providing financial 
support for the development of local economies as full commercial 
competitors and players of the Italian banking sector. The study 
points out the strong link between efficiency performance and the 
evolution of the sector characterised by a transition from a 
territorial proximity to a regional brand and thus to a partial 
collapse. Via the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis – Slack 
Based Model methodology, the evaluation of the SBs efficiency score 
is carried out over the 2010-2015 period. The results show that SBs 
belonging to a Bank Group regularly outperform the Stand-Alone 
ones. Thus, generally increasing technical efficiency, managerial 
efficiency and scale efficiency confirm the sectorial evolution. The 
study is innovative for considering the question of SBS and 
territorial branding of banking groups. Moreover, its results help to 
understand how to avoid the same mistakes of the past in the 
future, therefore, under current circumstances, it is particularly 
important for scholars, managers, people of local communities, and 
decision-makers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The banking sector, although suffering of a 
significant (sometimes rightly) criticism, plays a 
fundamental function in countries economics. SBs 
are part of it being fundamental in the economics 
developments of countries and evolved to full-
service commercial banks, attempting to maximize 
profits, being virtually indistinguishable from their 
commercial bank competitors (Gardener et al. 1997) 
and Choudhry and Jayasekera (2014) recently 
confirmed the importance of banking efficiency for a 
functioning market, also as a private enterprise that 
produce a public good (Mottura, 2015). The global 
crisis and the weak economic restoration, as per the 
Hansen (1939) Great Depression definition, belongs 
to the economic “secular” stagnation. In such 
period, the follows of ethical drivers and business 
efficiency is essential for the support of little local 
economies. However, as banks strive for greater 
operational efficiency, the increased level of 
competition can lead them to face excessive risks 
(Hellman, Stiglitz, et al. 2000). Although many 
scholars’ states much about the banking corporate 
governance, is almost true that the banking sector 
shows relevant differences with respect to other 
corporations and economic sectors, justifying the 
distinctive interests in its governance problems 
(Adams and Mehran 2012).  
From a historical perspective, these institutions 
played a pivotal role in promoting local economies 
and social development. As per Bülbül et al. (2013) 
“until about 25 years ago, almost all European 
countries had a so-called “three pillar” banking 
system comprising private banks, (public) savings 
banks and (mutual) cooperative banks”. The SBs 
pillar is described as the original microfinance 
institutions of the nineteenth and even eighteenth 
centuries (Seibel, 2005) born via different roots; 
sometimes set up by publicly minded private 
philanthropists but just as often by local or national 
public finance bodies. The aim of those special kind 
of corporations was the provision of a safe harbour 
as well as some basic form of payments mechanism. 
Put it simple, a local SB born led by local 
governments in order to offer some savings and 
payments services as, also, a local credit service. 
These corporations, typically began as mutual 
institutions operating with a significant level of 
public involvement while, currently, there is no 
requirement for SBs to operate under any particular 
organisational structure, just being careful not to 
violate the EU competition law (Ehlermann, 1992).  
In such a scenario, competitive pressures like 
the need to realise capital adequacy requirements 
have led to some SBs sectorial restructuration. Thus, 
reflecting the Matsuoka point of view (2013) on 
“competition-fragility” when argues that higher 
competition leads to a more risk taking approach in 
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banking and the loss of bank value, Beck et al. 
(2013) on the fact that a greater competition is 
generally associated with larger impact on banks’ 
risk-taking activities and Liu et al. (2012) that 
displayed a positive link between competition and 
bank stability, without explicitly focusing on 
cooperative banks and savings banks. When 
considering the link with territorial proximity 
researcher as Ahn and Le (2015) has investigate on 
German savings banks (mostly focusing on 
mathematical models development), Chiaramonte et 
al. (2015) on a sample of cooperative, savings and 
commercial banks from OECD countries and their 
contribution to banking sector stability, and Barra 
et. Al. (2013) on cooperative banks, there are no 
recent Italian studies on Italian saving banks.  
In Italy, the government set a SBs sectorial 
reform attempting to reorganize the sectorial legal 
framework reform while removing distinctions and 
transforming the public banks into JSCs. The main 
idea was the State controls reduction, without the 
loss of the social principles reassigned to the 
Foundations. The Amato Law led to the born of 
Foundations, in a context of Italian Banks 
privatisation reforms because until the 80ies Italian 
banks were still under public control with more than 
80% run by the State. Nowadays, the SBs current 
legal form belongs to the sphere of joint stock 
institution (Joint Stock Companies – the Italian 
Società per Azioni – S.p.A.). In other European 
countries, they still belong to local form of State 
economy intervention (e.g. relevant in Germany).  
Due to its being commercial competitors, 
Köhler (1996) highlights the relevance of the SBs 
efficiency evaluation stating that, they must have an 
efficient management and sound earning capacity 
being subject to those same competitive forces 
within the EU banking system. In Italy, SBs had a 
congruous influence on local territories. The aim of 
this paper is to determine the relative efficiency of 
the Italian SBs banking sector and to show how the 
same trend has influenced the sectorial 
transformation. Moreover, Saccomanni (2012) states 
that “The Supervisory analysis show, however, that 
the performance of SBs became part of banking 
large size banks large, and in which the Foundations 
hold minority shareholdings, are on average better 
than those of the SBs subject to the exclusive control 
of Foundations”. The latter is a specific and direct 
confirmation of the SBs Italian trend on which our 
research questions relies. 
Hence, our actuality live-linked study, address 
the question:  
RQ: There is a relative efficiency recent trend 
that led the transformation of the Italian SBs and 
allows for its shifting from a territorial proximity to 
a territorial branding and finally to a partial 
sectorial demise?  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only 
study devoted to such Italian SBs sectorial trends. 
The article organization is as follows: historical 
excursus and literature review provides the 
evolution of SBs and banking efficiency studies; in 
the second part data and methodology explains the 
research methodology and describes data sources 
along with the financial statements variables details. 
Finally, results and conclusions present empirical 
findings, discussion and concluding remarks. 
2. BRIEF HISTORICAL EXCURSUS AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
Institutions such as SBs born on a specific kind of 
mission: the spread of the “spirit of parsimony” 
among families belonging to lowest economic 
classes, promoting a savings mentality in order to 
help them in difficult times. This main mission was 
enlarged and stretched to the desire of enable the 
access to financial services for individuals that were 
not able to afford it them and support the local 
SMEs within their local communities (Ayadi, et al., 
2009). This original mission is common to all 
current existing SBs that should follow the dual 
objective, the economic and the social one. 
The 18th century, in Europe, is to be remind as 
the age of “private enterprise” because of the 
collective and individual efforts to reach prosperity 
without any apprehension about forms of public 
and/or social responsibility. Indeed, the European 
framework was characterised by smalls, large 
fragmented governments and wicked relationship. 
For instance, in the later 19th century England, their 
growth slowed and reversed in opposition to the 
growing path of other countries such as France, 
Italy, Germany, United States, France, Italy and Spain 
(Wadhwani, 2011). 
The SBs profitability and financial 
sustainability was functional to their share (or 
“charge”) of the public welfare, often showing 
realising no profits. Starting from several SBs 
countries regulatory reform waves of circa three 
decades ago, the SBs distinctiveness suffered of a 
progressive reduction. Indeed, it the territorial form 
(regional or local) is for the greatest part completely 
contracted such as the public ownership and 
organisational form under a public law regime (a 
part from some specific case such the German one). 
With reference to the goal of encouraging the 
spread of a parsimony and saving mentality among 
the citizens, taking into account the peoples state of 
crises, currently this is a secondary target because 
of their engagement in also others and complex 
problems such as the fight to survive to hard times 
(mostly true for South European Peoples) while 
competing in open financial markets and fully 
challenging all the business principles. 
 
2.1. A Brief History of Italian Saving Banks 
 
The forerunners of the Italian SBs are the Mounts of 
Piety. The close connection between Mounts of Piety 
and SBs relies, also, on the fact that many SBs arose 
as the results of mergers. The first national sector 
regulations, adopted after the Italian process of 
reunification, is the Law no. 753 of August 3, 1862, 
which identified the Mount of Piety as institutional 
pawnbrokers and SBs as charities organisations. The 
so-called “Florence Congress” established the 
approval of proposals to the Government concretely 
asking for a recognition “with precise laws of the 
existence mode of Saving Banks” trying to eliminate 
any uncertainty about their character and legal 
status.  
The author of the project (Minister Grimaldi) 
underlined that governmental intention was to 
define the main SBs characteristics and the 
definition of clear rules and legal framework. At the 
end of the parliamentary process, was issued the 
Law no. 5546 of October 1888 as the first organic 
law on SBs sector (the law was approved with the 
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Royal Decree no. 3290 of April 1889, later replaced 
by the regulations of the Royal Decree no. 43 of 
January 1897). Indeed, the Crispi Law1, provide the 
attribution of the legal status to all SBs and a 
homogeneous framework, distinct either from that 
about Charity Opera and from commercial 
companies. 
In 1926, the Banking Act as per the Law n.2587 
of 1927, established as mandatory the merger of 
Mounts and during the coming decades, SBs enjoyed 
a period of expansion, with their independence not 
subjected to any regulatory intervention. With the 
advent of Mussolini Government, we saw the 
development of the interventionism on SBs as the 
birth of the so-called “petrified forest” (an 
expression became famous because of the metaphor 
described by ministry Giuliano Amato, nowadays 
Judge of the Constitutional Court). 
The Royal Decree Law no. 269 of February 
1927, introduced modifications for the ordinary SBs 
accentuating their dependence on the government 
with the loss of a mere supervision and the 
introduction of a true control while the Royal Decree 
no. 375 of March 1936, with the idea of defining a 
new banking discipline and solve some structural 
problems of the banking world, laid down the new 
Act on banking and credit matters. In 1938, on the 
eve of WWII the regime attack the heart of SBs 
autonomy with the Royal Decree Law of 24 February 
1938, converted into the Law 3 June 1938 (Ministry 
Mussolini), provide rules about the appointment of 
the President and the Vice President of SBs as a 
personal prerogative of the head of government. In 
fact, SBs were forced to merge into Regional 
Federations, harnessed and directed by the 
cooperative system (the regime), with the loss of 
their identity. As results of rules and after the war, 
in 1961 the loans against pledge service was exert 
by 10 first class Mounts, 43 second class 50 SBs and 
three Public credit institutions.  
During the eighties, in 1985, the “banking 
activity” was defined as a business activity being the 
beginning of a disengagement process of the public 
sector in the banking sector as per the Law no. 23 of 
10 February 1981 n. 23 (referred to the State 
intervention for the recapitalization of Public Credit 
Institutions entrusting the task to the Ministry of 
Treasury) and the first Bank of Italy White Paper of 
Italy of 1981 on the organization of Public Credit 
institutions. 
In 1988 the Bank of Italy published a second 
white book which states the need for a formal (and 
substantial) privatisation with the adoption of an 
organisational civil law model (that of joint-stock 
companies). According to the Bank of Italy vision, 
the Government issued the so-called Amato Law no. 
218 of 30 July 1990 (restructuration and 
consolidation of credit institutions governed by 
public law) and the Legislative Decree no. 356 of 20 
November 1990 that refers to the banking groups’ 
regulation providing, in combination with the 
following Legislative Decree no. 356 of 1990 the 
reorganisation of the banking sector, also through 
the conversion of public banks into full JSCs leading 
to a formal but not substantial control of SBs (part 
of local politician influences). The privatisation 
process continued with the legislative interventions 
under the provisions of the Law no. 461 of 
December 31, 1998 (the so-called Ciampi Law), 
                                                          
1 Law 17 July 1890 no. 6972 in Official Gazette of 22 July 1890 no.171 on 
the public charities institutions 
which premise the actual distribution, among the 
public, of investments that these foundations had 
into SBs equity. 
However, as stated by the Constitutional Court 
in its judgment no. 163 of May 1995, the Court finds 
the existence of a genetic and functional link 
between the transferring entities and assignee 
banks. The transferring entities cease to exist as 
such, and are transformed into «Foundations», 
“private non-profit organization, with full statutory 
and management autonomy” which “pursue 
exclusively socially beneficial aims and the promotion 
of economic development in accordance with their 
respective statutes” (as per the art. 2 of Legislative 
Decree no. 153 of 1999). The Foundation heritage is 
specifically bound to the statutory purposes. The 
Foundations, from the entry into force of the 
Legislative Decree no. 153 of 1999 cannot acquire 
new controlling shareholdings in companies. In 
short, the above legal transformation was linked to 
a rigorous system of incompatibility with 
managerial and governance positions, respectively, 
in the Foundation and conferred SBs. The ratio of 
the rules that provides the banking Foundation 
assets destination to the exclusive social utility 
purpose. 
  
2.2. The Italian SBs Nineties Merge and Takeover 
Process 
 
In response to fundamental changes in regulation 
and technology, the financial industry undergone a 
consolidation wave. According to Amel, Panetta et 
al. (2004) the M&A in main industrialized countries 
were 19,996 between 1990 and 1995 and 34,147 
between 1996 and 2001. Italy, since the 1990 
gradual privatisation of its SBs, the “regional 
principle” was left via the banking business legal 
separation from social and cultural activities and 
decreased the public (even at local level) banks 
ownership. The Amato law (law 218/1990) of 1990 
was the trigger of the reform process and the 
ownership transferred to the (publicly owned) 
foundations. The foundations carry on the public 
ownership and command still owning SBs (even if in 
a downsized manner).  
The transformation in an expanded open 
financial system relied also on the 1994 Dini law 
(Law 474 of 1994) and the abrogation of the 
foundations obligation to retain the control of their 
JSCs. This law kicked off, officially, the privatisation 
of the Italian banking system. The last step in the 
banking system transformation was provide by the 
1998 Ciampi law (Law 461 of 1998) that set up a 
four-year time limit within the foundations were to 
sell the control they still held in banking companies. 
Foundations that complied with the law benefited of 
relevant tax exemptions. 
The Italian banking reforms of the 1990s 
implied the change of the whole banking industry 
nature. The drivers of efficiency and performance 
substituted the seasoned aim (as primary objective) 
of supporting territories and local economies. 
Simultaneously, in the nineties the empirical 
investigations on banking grew and resulted in a 
wave of novel, creative and refined (parametric and 
non-parametric) research studies that often detected 
significant economies of scale for medium-sized and 
large banks (Berger and Mester 1997; Dermine 1999) 
to which, also SBs, evolved. When referring to 
efficiency and performance, the current framework, 
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fully integrating the competition and open financial 
market principles, the “consolidation processes were 
accompanied by gains in efficiency and 
competitiveness, however not offsetting the 
increasing distortions in the ownership structure of a 
large part of the Italian banking groups” (Focarelli et 
al., 2002). Given what above, again, we recall the 
Saccomanni 2012 statement about the SBs becoming 
part of large size banking group because of the 
efficiencies improvements. 
 
2.3. Note on the Current Italian SBs Sector and 
Latest News 
 
In Italy, SBs starting their operation in the 
nineteenth century as institutions in which the 
credit and social aspects were living together. 
However, at the end of the twentieth century due to 
sectoral regulatory developments they turn into full 
joint stock companies being their social and 
philanthropic role transferred to the philanthropic 
foundations.  
According to ACRI (2015) as contribution to 
sector, Italian SBs at the end of 2014 are forty and 
holds 3,733 (in 2014 were 4,345) branches, 30.967 
employees (in 2014 were more than 36 thousand), 
total assets of 183.1 billion (in 2014 were 206.2 
billion) and 134.8 in direct deposits (in 2014 were 
144.4 billion). Banking groups (which partly belongs 
to the local territorial Foundations) own SBs in the 
attempt to cover the link between the ancient SBs 
and the local strong proximity to communities and 
territories. Furthermore, at the end of 2012, (the 
starting point of our sample for the relative 
efficiency study level), Italian SBs were 39 of which 
23 are part of bank groups and 16 are stand-alone 
while 11 out of the 23 SBs part of a group belongs 
to the Intesa San Paolo Group. 
In 2015, according to the Italian Law Decree 22 
November 2015, n. 183 (a.k.a. “decreto salva-
banche” – which contains rules to ensure the 
continuity of financial services offered by four 
distressed banks as Banca delle Marche, Cassa di 
Risparmio di Ferrara, Cassa di Risparmio di Chieti 
and Banca Etruria), two SBs were terminated (namely 
the 50%). Actually, the decree aimed to the complete 
reduction of the reserves, capital represented by 
shares, and nominal value of subordinated 
liabilities, resulting in termination of the 
administrative and property rights. Indeed, the 
Italian Government chose to formally terminate 
distress banks and set up new banks without 
deteriorated and subordinated debts transferring to 
the local territories the high socio-economic impacts 
(put it simple, derived from a fraud). It was the de 
facto first application of the bail-in rules, even 
before the entry into force of the European Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).  
It is to be noticed that the Bank of Italy Report 
for 2014 (Banca d’Italia, 2014, 2015) states that in 
2008 – 2014 period the bank employees and 
branches decreased by about 17,900 (-5.6%) and 
3,400 (-9%) units because of distribution channels 
such as internet and mobile and the 57% of families 
has this kind of access while the 53% in 2014. The 
latter is another indirect confirmation of the loss of 
the links with local communities; peoples are able to 
switch rapidly from a bank to another. Bank 
branches decreased of an 1,5% with respect to 2014 
to 30.258 unity and 11,4% with respect to 2008 
mostly due to large size banks that, in order to 
recover some form of efficiency started to cut their 
number of branches. All considered and within the 
mentioned trend, in 2015 we observe the starting of 
the SBs termination process that is leading to a 
partial sectorial demise.  
 
2.4. On the Banking Efficiency Studies  
 
The study of Sherman and Gold (1985) is widely 
known as the first on banking industry via DEA 
technique and many others followed (Berger and 
Humphrey 1997; Ashton and Hardwick 2000; Fethi 
and Pasiouras 2010). Berger and De Young (1997), 
Kwan, and Eisenbeis (1997) states the relevance of 
the banks efficiency concept with reference to risks 
speculations. Moreover, Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
and Williams (2004) took into account the “bad 
management” hypothesis pointing out that a low 
levels of efficiency lead to lack of credit monitoring 
and inefficient control of operating expenses (which 
has immediate effect on cost efficiency). With 
reference to Altunbas et al. (2007) and Sufian (2009) 
studies, Italian SBs can suffer of scale inefficiencies 
because of their findings on larger size banks 
sample and results on efficient scale economies.  
Italian researchers started investigation on 
banking efficiency in nineties. Important studies 
were developed by Favero-Papi (1995) and Resti 
(1997) highlighting scale inefficiencies and regional 
disparities while Casolaro and Gobbi (2007) worked 
on the IT influence and others on Italian cooperative 
banks (Lopez et al., 2002; Battaglia and Ricci, 2008; 
Bonanno, 2012, Barra et al., 2013; Zago and Dongili, 
2014; Aiello and Bonanno, 2015). Together, Italian 
and European scholars conducted a comparison on 
results obtained in different countries (Vivas, 1997) 
in the investigation of economies and efficiency of 
conglomerates (Casu and Girardone, 2002). 
However, most of their studies focuses on 
commercial banks, while fewer examines also SBs 
efficiency.  
With respect to the SBs sector and the nineties 
merger wave, Messori (2002) analysed the effects of 
the Italian banking merger process underlining that 
the processes of banking consolidation achieved an 
increase in efficiency and competitiveness. The 
evolution of competitive conditions in the Italian 
banking sector was analysed, with a parametric 
approach, by Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), pointing 
out that the process of legislative deregulation 
boosted the banking competition and mergers. The 
Carletti et al. (2005) study dedicated to the Italian 
SBs merger process underlined the success of the 
Italian nineties legislative framework reforms due to 
an increase in profitability.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Our study follows an eclectic and intertwined path 
that involves the measurement of banking efficiency 
following the Data Envelopment Analysis (over the 
2010-2015 period). DEA is a non-parametric 
programming technique introduced by Charnes et 
al. (1978) aim at the measure of the relative, to the 
best one, bank performance by converting multiple 
inputs and outputs of each decision-making unit 
into measurable units. The DEA developed by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) is grounded on 
the Farrell’s work (1957), “The measurement of 
productive efficiency” and the main advantages are 
the ability to accommodate a multiplicity of inputs 
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and outputs, the no a priori weights assumption and 
the requirement of small number of observations 
(Sexton, 1986).  
The main reason for the use of Efficiency 
Frontier Techniques like DEA lies in the fact that 
frontier approaches appears to be superior to 
standard financial ratios analysis (Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005) as, also, per the Basel Committee 
report (2006) which stated that the frontier 
efficiency measures provides a better 
comprehension over traditional ratios, especially on 
corporate governance issues. Moreover, Paradi and 
Zhu (2013) survey found that there has been sharp 
increase in DEA application in order to measure 
banking sector efficiency and that figures are likely 
to grow after the global financial crisis. 
The  Constant  Returns  to  Scale (CCR) DEA  
model enhancement, in order to account for the 
evaluation of Variable Returns to Scale, is the BCC 
(Variable Return to Scale) model of Banker, Charnes 
and Cooper (1984). The VRS model means that it 
scores the pure technical efficiency (also called 
managerial efficiency) and includes the so-called 
convexity constraints by changing the specification 
of the problem and providing the measure of 
Managerial Efficiency θ VRS adding eλ = 1 to the 
program (in 1.1 θ is a scalar and λ is a vector of 
constants). The Table 1 presents the CCR, BCC and 
SBM linear models. In the case of the SBM model the 
variables 𝑠+ and 𝑠− are the measure of the distance 
of inputs Xλ and outputs Yλ of a virtual unit from 
those of the unit evaluated. In order to account for 
the SBM Variable Returns to Scale, the condition 𝑒𝑇λ 
= 1 needs to be added to the formula. 
 
Table 1. Data envelopment analysis: CCR, BCC and SBM models 
 
1.1. CCR Model (Constant Return to 
Scale) Input oriented 
1.2. BCC Model (Variable Return to 
Scale) Input oriented 
1.3. SBM Model (Constant Return to Scale) 
Input oriented 
 
min θ 
s.t.   θ𝑥𝑗 - Xλ ≥ 0, 
Yλ ≥ 𝑦𝑗 
λ ≥ 0 
 
 
min θ 
s.t.   θ𝑥𝑗 - Xλ ≥ 0, 
Yλ ≥ 𝑦𝑗 
eλ = 1 
λ ≥ 0 
 
ρ =  
min
𝜆, 𝑠−, 𝑠+
1 −
1
𝑚
∑
𝑠𝑖
−
𝑥𝑖𝑜
𝑚
𝑖=1
1 +
1
𝑠
∑
𝑠𝑟
+
𝑦𝑟𝑜
𝑠
𝑟=1
 
 
s.t.      𝑥0 − 𝑠
− = 𝑋𝜆 
 
𝑦0 + 𝑠
+ = 𝑌𝜆 
 
𝜆 ≥ 0,   𝑠− ≥ 0,    𝑠+ ≥ 0 
 
An efficient DMUs, under DEA methodology, 
receive an efficiency scores of θ = 1, while the DMUs 
scoring less than 1 are inefficient. The input 
orientation is addressed by the question: “By how 
much can input quantities be proportionally reduced 
without changing the output quantities produced?”. 
The efficiency measure is associate to the use of a 
minimum number of inputs in order to produce a 
certain number of outputs or the maximum 
production of outputs using a certain number of 
inputs (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). The measure of 
the scale efficiency is the ratio of CRS efficiency 
scores to VRS efficiency scores meaning that is equal 
to 𝐶𝑅𝑆 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒/ 𝑉𝑅𝑆 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒. The lower the scale 
efficiency is, the higher the impact of scale size 
(Thanassoulis, 2001). 
In order to measure the banking efficiency 
there are two main approaches: the intermediation 
approach and the production approach. The 
intermediation approach was proposed by Sealy and 
Lindley (1977) aiming at the maximisation of the 
market value of financial intermediaries. In this 
light, deposits are view as part of the intermediation 
process of taking deposits and subsequently 
transforming into loans. Banks are financial 
intermediaries between depositors and creditors. 
They collect deposits and other liabilities to apply 
them as interest-earning assets. Deposits are 
considered as input while there is a great 
consideration of the operating costs. In the 
production approach as per Benston (1965) a bank is 
defined as a financial institution that produces 
services for its customers and producers of 
deposits, loans and other services. The main 
difference between the two approaches is the 
treatment of deposits. In the light of the production 
approach deposits are considered as an output. The 
purpose of the production approach is to minimize 
the operating costs and it uses the traditional 
factors of production of capital and labour to 
produce the number of accounts of loan and deposit 
services. Ahn and Lee (2014) have recently provided 
an insight into DEA inputs and outputs specification 
in order to understand whether these are consistent 
with the criteria upon which banks make decisions. 
A Recently a study of Toloo and Tichý (2015) used 
deposits an output and in the context of the survey 
made by Toloo et al. (2015) it has shown that 
deposits can be useful as both inputs and outputs 
with prevalence on outputs consideration. 
With reference to recent researches in this 
field, the input and output variables for this paper 
were selected according partially to the production 
and intermediation approach. On the inputs side, the 
first input of total assets Bank is a proxy for the 
bank size. Total operating expenses represents the 
labour input built as the sum of personnel expenses 
and other operating expenses. When referring to 
risk, many take it into account as a proxy for risk 
the NPLs (Non Profit Loans) (see Fiorentino et al., 
2009; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Asmild and Zhu 2012). 
In our study, the risk variable, proxy, is the use of 
impaired loans that are able to represent the risk 
likely to occur. Klein (2013) too accounted for 
Impaired Loans that are able to embed, in a risk 
management perspective, a more extensive 
aggregate. On the risk side, Ferri and Pesic (2016) 
and Barucci and Milani (2016), provide evidences of 
the so-called regulatory arbitrage phenomenon by 
banks in manipulating risk coefficients.  
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3.1. Data Specifications and Variables Accounting 
for Our SBM Model 
 
The Italian efficiency SBs analysis covers units 
ranging from 23 to 40, during a six years’ period. 
The specific focus on the 2010 - 2015 takes into 
account the crisis eruption of 2007 and the 
downward spiral of a global 2008/09 recession while 
a general consensus (after many believes of 
reestablishment) aggregates on the fact that from 
2010 to 2015 the economics framework was a 
stagnating one (Jimeno et al., 2014; Truger, 2014; 
Gordon, 2014; Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015; Storm 
and Naastepad, 2015; Hein, 2016; European 
Parliament, 2016). 
SBs showing lacks of reliable data and outliers, 
for the variable taken into account, were excluded. 
We estimate separate annual efficiency frontiers 
rather than a common frontier across time by 
allowing an efficient bank in one year to be 
inefficient in another as, also, per Isik and Hassan 
(2002).  
The study, in order to provide single yearly 
snapshots, intentionally relies on the use of 6 years 
data, considering it independently. In fact, each SBs 
year efficiency is computed on its DEA model 
reference. The data integration of sources such as 
Bankscope - Bureau Van Dijk (2016) and ACRI 
(Associazione di Fondazioni e Casse di Risparmio 
S.p.A.) results in our dataset. The following is a 
resume table of the SBs sample dataset composition.  
 
Table 1. The SBs sample dataset over the 2010–2015 period with respect to the SB belonging to a group or not 
 
SBs 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
SBs SAMPLE 23 29 34 37 40 38 
GROUP 11 16 20 22 25 23 
NO GROUP 12 13 14 15 15 15 
As the first step, we evaluate the Italian SBs 
efficiency and in a second step, we compare results 
against their being part of a bank group. Following 
and enhancing Alfiero et al. (2016), the variables we 
chose fits to measure the relative efficiency of the 
Italian SBs consisting of three inputs such as total 
assets, operating expenses (personnel plus other 
operating expenses), impaired loan and three 
outputs such as loans, customer deposits and 
operating profits. Table 2 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of the six variables sample.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the Simple (Inputs and Outputs) variables of the SBM non-oriented Constant 
Return to Scale and Variable Return to Scale models (SBM – CRS, SBM VRS) (in millions of €). 
 
Variable I/O Year Minimum Maximum Average Standard Deviation 
Total Assets 𝑋1 
2015 
2014 
2013 
2012 
2011 
2010 
1,051.20 
709.00 
709.70 
799.70 
609.30 
583.70 
51,373.20 
52.203.50 
50,162.70 
49,322.00 
49,290.70 
46,339.10 
7,615.13 
7,211.66 
6,760.16 
6,575.02 
5,888.39 
5,954.14 
11,000.73 
10,528.96 
9,959.69 
10,105.80 
10,275.16 
10,070.47 
Total Operating 
Expenses 
𝑋2 
2015 
2014 
2013 
2012 
2011 
2010 
20.70 
20.30 
19.80 
17.20 
15.50 
14.60 
1,020.40 
976.70 
1,009.90 
1,187.40 
1,074.10 
879.70 
159.10 
153.68 
137.66 
140.22 
130.94 
12.98 
217.50 
206.91 
198.84 
233.56 
220.26 
201.55 
Impaired Loans 𝑋3 
2015 
2014 
2013 
2012 
2011 
2010 
82.60 
64.60 
60.90 
45.70 
30.30 
29.20 
5,057.40 
4,473.00 
3,895.00 
3,141.00 
2,452.00 
2,014.40 
1,224.23 
1,083.91 
821.21 
600.19 
437.92 
362.88 
1,472.71 
1,325.63 
1,062.47 
793.38 
654.45 
520.45 
Loans 𝑌1 
2015 
2014 
2013 
2012 
2011 
2010 
638.10 
610.40 
639.10 
635,3 
451.70 
427.90 
36,462.50 
37,275.80 
36,391.90 
35,128.10 
34,783.10 
30,406.60 
5,248.24 
5,018.45 
4,758.99 
4,725.48 
4,420.76 
4,403.13 
7,658.61 
7,393.80 
7,006.02 
6,978.97 
7,292.64 
6,888.40 
Operating Profits 𝑌2 
2015 
2014 
2013 
2012 
2011 
2010 
-249.30 
-532.50 
-676.30 
-226.90 
-29.60 
-64.50 
328.00 
256.10 
268.70 
102.00 
293.40 
409.00 
3.86 
-10.09 
5.23 
-6.32 
20.14 
22.76 
92.83 
129.71 
139.56 
53.59 
58.88 
73.55 
Total Customer 
Deposits 
𝑌3 
2015 
2014 
2013 
2012 
2011 
2010 
508.10 
496.60 
484.20 
439.80 
276.80 
294.40 
28,401.50 
25,254.90 
23,251.80 
22,018.80 
22,888.80 
18,114.80 
4,027.03 
578.65 
3,137.20 
2,835.64 
2,668.,80 
2,697.23 
5,935.76 
5,085.22 
4,469.73 
4,145.28 
4,472.,58 
4,090.47 
Sources: BANKSCOPE - Bureau Van Dijk (2016); ACRI (2016) 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Taking into account the SBs merger process started 
in nineties and our eclectically path, what follows 
are the results of our investigation. In Table 3 we 
point out the sectorial Total Asset Values (and its 
decreasing) and percentages with respect to the SBs 
belonging to a bank group or not only for the 2012-
2014 (a three years’ period before the shutdown of 
2015). The following are the results. 
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Table 3. Results of the Total Assets (as a size proxy) sectorial investigation as per the period 2010-2015 
 
SBs Year Total Assets 100% SBs Group Total Assets SBs Stand-Alone Total Assets 
2010 226.257,50 148.602,30 (65,68 %) 77.655,20 (34,32 %) 
2011 235.535,60 151.253,80 (64,22 %) 84.281,80 (35,78 %) 
2012 251.969,20 156.699,10 (62.19 %) 95.270,10 (37,81 %) 
2013 241.597,40 153.703,50 (63.62 %) 87.893,90 (36,38 %) 
2014 224.114,80 146.103,40 (65.19 %) 78.011,40 (34,81%) 
2015 175.148,00 104.574,40 (67,49 %) 70.573,60 (32,51 %) 
 
Table 3, showing the sectorial size trend, 
blatantly reveal the decreasing trend of SBs stand-
alone total assets and the increasing trend for those 
SBs belonging to a bank group. Moreover, it shows 
that, with respect to the sector size, two-third of the 
sector is hold by banking groups. This is a clear 
evidence and confirmation of the sectorial 
transformation into territorial brands of banking 
groups.  
As a starting point, in order to answer to RQ, 
Table 4 show results for the relative SBM efficiency 
scores over the 2010-2015 period alongside with 
their graphic trend. 
 
Table 4. Results of the relative SBM efficiency of the Italian SBs over the 2010-2015 period and trend graphic 
 
GENERAL SBM CRS SBM VRS SE 
2010 0,730939 0,879668 0,830926 
2011 0,65461 0,816765 0,801467 
2012 0,694719 0,879303 0,790079 
2013 0,713741 0,929132 0,76818 
2014 0,720831 0,888779 0,811035 
2015 0,75043 0,865761 0,866787 
AVERAGE 0,710879 0,876568 0,807491 
 
The noticeable alternate trend of the technical 
efficiency (SBM-CRS), the managerial efficiency (SBM 
- VRS) and the scale efficiency (SE) proving a final  
increasing trend. The relative SBM efficiency of the 
SBs part of a group and stand-alone is highlighted in 
the following Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Efficiency results of Italian SBs with respect to their belonging to a bank group. 
SBs belonging to a bank group 
GROUP SBM CRS  SBM VRS SE  
2010 0,788826 0,915661 0,861483 
2011 0,760744 0,900404 0,844892 
2012 0,806695 0,948573 0,850431 
2013 0,77746 0,957065 0,812338 
2014 0,842706 0,980194 0,859734 
2015 0,908182 0,973327 0,933069 
AVERAGE 0,814102 0,945871 0,852268 
 
SBs NOT belonging to a bank group 
NO GROUP SBM CRS  SBM VRS SE  
2010 0,64218 0,82448 0,778891 
2011 0,485406 0,677367 0,716608 
2012 0,530487 0,777707 0,682117 
2013 0,622714 0,889229 0,700286 
2014 0,570831 0,776269 0,735352 
2015 0,605825 0,767158 0,7897 
AVERAGE 0,57624 0,785368 0,725872 
 
Table 5 is the direct confirmation of the 2012 
Bank of Italy General Manager statement 
(Saccomanni, 2012). Indeed, the SBs belonging to a 
bank group shows, generally, a better and increasing 
(almost) of the technical efficiency (CRS), managerial 
efficiency  (VRS)  and  scale  efficiency (SE) over the 
6-year period. They outperform, constantly, the 
efficiency of SBs not belonging to a bank group as 
per the following graph. This result is, again, the 
best confirmation of the sectorial transformation 
into territorial brands of banking groups. 
 
Figure 1. Graph showing the relative efficiency of 2010-2015 period with respect to the belong or not to 
a bank group 
 
 
 
An insight into the inefficiencies provides a 
better and clear confirmation of the Saccomanni 
statement as per the following Figure 2 where the 
inefficiency trends of the SBs belonging to a Bank 
Group is undisputable decreasing.  
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Figure 2. Technical, managerial and scale inefficiencies of Italian SBs belonging to a Bank Group and 
Stand-Alone 
 
SBs belonging to a Bank Group 
 
SBs Stand-Alone 
 
From the above graphs is easy to point out that 
the efficiency of SBs belonging to a Bank Group 
outperforms, regularly, that one of those Stand-
Alone. This result is the confirmation that SBs are 
currently considered just as territorial brands of a 
big size bank group. Indeed, the past inefficiencies 
and the current one are of significance in order to 
understand the sectorial termination process 
pointed out in the conclusions. 
With respect to the three inputs such as total 
assets, operating expenses, impaired loan and the 
three outputs such as loans, customer deposits and 
operating profits, the following Fig. 3 shows an 
insight into the slacks values. 
 
Figure 3. The Slacks trend over the 2010–2015 with respect to the six considered variables 
 
 
 
The quick snapshot of Fig. 3 is able to show the 
combined sums of relevant slacks over the 2010 –
2015 period, namely the achievable improvements 
of inputs or outputs with respect to the efficiency 
frontier, obviously without worsening the situation. 
Indeed, slacks are mainly relevant on the inputs side 
regarding the total assets, impaired loan while less 
significant on the outputs side where only the 
customer deposits variable shows some meaningful 
implication. This result is able to provide a clear a 
concise information about the relevance of the 
banking size and the risk factor represented by the 
impaired loans.  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Historically, the merge and takeover process can be 
attribute to SBs previous financial conditions or 
because of hidden financial crime scandals. The 
results of our work, by means of DEA SBM model, 
are of significance in evaluating SBs performance 
because of their focusing on inefficiencies source.  
Indeed, the almost outperformance of SBs 
belonging to a bank group on the technical 
efficiency, managerial efficiency and scale efficiency 
over the considered timeframe it may be considered 
as parte of managerial issues because of their 
borrowing managerial experiences. Indeed, the 
benefits of being part of a bank groups are clearly 
deriving from the integration of enhanced groups’ 
managerial strategic and tactical corporate policies. 
In addition, the slacks investigation appear to 
be useful for future direction of improvements in 
order to enhance the efficiency. Indeed, slacks 
accounting for the inputs side regarding as of total 
assets and impaired loans may allow to managers to 
more precise decisions. As a further confirmation of 
our results, Ferri et al. (2014) provide evidence that 
higher shares of cooperative banks (saving banks 
among the latter) in national banking systems led to 
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low credit standards throughout the recent crisis, 
therefore the envelope in our model of the Impaired 
Loans variable is of fundmental relevance. 
According to our research question, the 
research findings coupled with the recent milestone 
year for the Italian SBs sector as of 2015, are a 
further confirmation of the sectorial trend. At the 
end of May 2016 the ending results of SBs 
termination process (that mostly affect the year 
2015), some of which as per as per Italian Law 
Decree n. 183 (a.k.a. “decreto salva-banche”), are the 
following:  
 
Table 6. The 2015-2016 SBs process of termination 
 
Nr. Saving Banks Date of Termination 
1 Banca Adriatico (former CARISAP) 16 of May 2016 
2 CR Savona 23 of November 2015 
3 CR Carrara December 2015 
4 CR Rieti 23 of November 2015 
5 CR Viterbo 23 of November 2015 
6 CR Civitavecchia 23 of November 2015 
7 CR Chieti as per Italian Law Decree n. 183 22 of November 2015 
8 CR Ferrara as per Italian Law Decree n. 183 22 of November 2015 
 
It is of some relevance, that four out of the 
eight terminated banks belongs to Intesa San Paolo 
Group while the others being stand-alone SBs or 
belonging to another troublesome bank group, 
shows a low efficiency level and the last two are the 
de-facto bankruptcies banks as per Italian Law 
Decree n. 183 (a.k.a. “decreto salva-banche”). 
Moreover, in line with our thoughts, SBs belonging 
to a bank group show a better level of efficiency. 
The results, coupled with real circumstances such as 
the Italian Law Decree 183/2015 and the 
termination process, provides useful insights to 
decision-makers. 
Taking into consideration the high efficiency 
level of four terminated SBs (average of 0,9543 on 
SBM-VRS managerial efficiency on 2014 score) and 
the fact that belongs to Intesa San Paolo Group 
shows, it is possible to infer that those banks were, 
at some point, operating just as territorial brands. 
Hence, the Intesa San Paolo management considered 
the “mission accomplished” and “well done” because 
of the achieved target leading to their legal 
termination. The remaining SBs due their 
termination, mainly to bad management, financial 
scandals where not serious financial crimes as main 
drivers that leads to the dismissal of power from 
local influencing policy-maker politicians’ people. 
Indeed, all the concerns about consolidation and the 
survival of small SBs have been correct. Is possible 
to address this shift also to the bad management 
behaviour of the local Foundation and institutions 
that appoints the SBs top management.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The post Amato SBs reform (surfing also the global 
financial crisis) revealed, up to date, a significant 
criticism on the politicisation of SBs and the lack of 
managerial skills. Thus, backgrounded by empirical 
evidences (the merger and termination process) is 
just a confirmation of the loss of the regional and 
local credit service focus that was, at the starting of 
SBs history, the expression of local citizens, an 
added value as per their philanthropic purposes. 
The article illustrates how management may 
better identify the source of inefficiencies and main 
potential improvements, and how the efficient or 
benchmark frontier technique may useful in 
evaluating the banks performance. The research and 
its results are a direct confirmation that the SBs 
negative trend and the nineties merge and takeover, 
led to the restructuration process currently at its 
apex.  
In addition, clear evidence about a territorial 
proximity story shifted into a territorial branding 
and to an ultimate partial demise were provided. 
According to this final finding, the partial sectorial 
demise trend is manifest and the fact that most of 
SBs still belongs to bank group, was and is the 
simple forecast exercise, of further future SBs 
terminations and loss of territorial proximity. 
Indeed, from our business management perspective, 
the SBs management incurred the same mistakes of 
the past becoming de-facto turned away from 
responsibilities and losing the territorial proximity 
as an overall result.  
There are a number of additional issues which, 
although of significance, are beyond the scope of 
this paper. These include the choice of other 
financial statements dimension as well as insight 
into the marketability dimensions. The limited 
number of Italian SBs did not allow, due to respect 
of the DEA rule of thumb, for expanding the model 
accounting for additional stream of variables.  
Future research direction by DEA application 
specific field application may be coupled by means 
of policy tool evaluation (e.g. Ichino-Becker score) in 
order to better assess differences and envelope, by 
an improved fine-tuning, the two main stream of 
profitability dimension.  
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